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Abstract 
Competitiveness is clearly one of the most frequently used concepts in current economic policies, in the regional or 
national policy frameworks and strategies, in businesses, especially when they discuss about growth or convergence, 
when strategies or comparative analysis are designed. Indeed, there are different theories around competitiveness, 
different approaches by policy makers and various targets are projected, both at micro and macro levels. Going 
thoroughly within policies and literature, it can be admitted that competitiveness is still vague, ambiguous, but 
wrapped up in ingenuity. There are still many open questions related to the definition of competitiveness, 
competitiveness factors, the applicability and the practical approaches to foster competitiveness. Is competitiveness 
just an entrepreneurial skill to sell or could be a premise of development? This paper tries to bring together the EU’s 
approaches and myths about competitiveness and to contribute to a fair scientific debate on international 
competitiveness.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
The present paper builds on the authors’ research within the affiliated institution and aims to bring various ideas 
regarding international competitiveness theories, policies and strategies closer to a common European 
understanding. The concept of competitiveness has evolved in the history of economic thinking, embracing different 
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approaches, from classical theories of mercantilism, which introduced the notion of trade rivalry between nations, to 
absolute advantage of nations, the theories of competitive and comparative advantages and up to neoclassical 
critiques of international competitiveness of countries. More recent theories (Porter, 2000; Martin, 2005; Thissen 
and co., 2013) developed the concept of regional competitiveness, bringing classical theories more close to applied 
economics of the regions. The European Commission (EC) adopted the policy goals of regional competitiveness, as 
a main instrument of inducing economic growth, ability to export and performance on the global market. (Martin, 
2005) The studies of Thissen and co. (2013) about the international competitiveness of regions brought the 
competitiveness discussion on to the dimension of relations between regions, stating that in order to understand who 
is competing with whom and for what, it is not enough to look only at the assets of cities and regions but 
additionally to build and employ an analytical framework that investigates the competing networks of assets of 
regions. The European Commission (2004) envisions a common future for competitiveness and cohesion policies, 
stating that “strengthening regional competitiveness throughout the Union and helping people fulfil their capabilities 
will boost the growth potential of the EU economy as a whole to the common benefit of all”. Is the regional 
competitiveness, based on smart specialization, the key that will bring together heterogeneous economies in Europe? 
It is not the goal of this paper to answer such question as this paper only aims to identify competitiveness 
approaches within various EU policies. In comparison with other global instruments that measure competitiveness 
(World Economic Forum, 2005) EU seems to adhere to a more complex understanding of international 
competitiveness, a concept that combines different EU policies’ objectives to boost growth among the countries, 
with a strategic goal of EU as a global actor. Eventually, this amounts to a stratified approach of competitiveness 
policy, under the umbrella of convergence of economies. 
2. International competitiveness of economies and its place in current attention 
International competitiveness has long been a major preoccupation of economic thought and has been receiving 
increasing attention from scientists, policy makers, businesses and general population alike. 
From a theoretical perspective, any rapid assessment would reveal an obvious lack of consensus regarding the 
exact meaning of competitiveness. Robert Z. Lawrence (1993) stated that “competitiveness, particularly with 
reference to an entire economy, is hard to define. Indeed, competitiveness, like love or democracy, actually has 
several meanings.” Theoretical origins of the concept of competitiveness can be traced in the economics of foreign 
trade and its role in national and international economic welfare. More recent theoretical debates enlarge on the 
conceptual complexity of countries’ competitiveness with existing approaches ranging from an exclusively 
microeconomic perspective to an all-encompassing micro- and macro-economic perspective. 
Such conceptual diversity also has practical implications. In an ever more globalised economic environment, 
economies face various competitiveness related risks and opportunities. Intensity and directions of goods, services, 
labour and capital flows between open economies have both increased and become more unstable with positive 
outcomes for some and negative for other economies and nations. National policy makers have been paying 
increasing attention to various international competitiveness rankings and aim at improving their country’s relevant 
policies in the quest for competitiveness gains. At the global level, international economic organizations take 
increasing competitiveness of nations as a prerequisite for the stability and growth of global economy and for the 
deeper integration of the developing economies in the international economic flows. Companies and general 
population pay particular attention to international comparison of nations’ competitiveness with the aim of both 
rapidly identifying business opportunities and having a more clear understanding of their nation’s relative welfare 
status, which, in turn, helps them shape their expectations from governments’ policies. 
3. Origins of the concept of international competitiveness of economies: classical and neoclassical theories and 
models concerning the international trade 
Classical and neoclassical theories regarding the international trade, such as mercantilism, absolute and 
comparative advantage or the relative endowment with production factors, more or less explicitly build on the 
concept of competitiveness between countries. 
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3.1. Mercantilism 
According to Laura La Haye (2008), mercantilism dominated Western European economic thought and policies 
from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries and represented the economic dimension of nationalism, an 
ideology that aimed at consolidating regional power centres of the feudal era into wealthy and powerful nation-states 
such as England, France or Germany. Political, military and trade supremacy were considered critical welfare 
sources and legitimate policy goals. Welfare, on the other hand, was perceived to be limited at the international level 
by the total amount of gold and silver resources available globally at one time (i.e. rather fixed, at least in the short 
run). It followed that not only warfare and political confrontations resulted in winners and losers but international 
trade, as well, was considered an important source of national prosperity in a zero sum game played at the 
international level. 
The main policy goals followed in the mercantilist era across Western Europe included self-sufficiency, 
interventionism and protectionism. The expected process and outcomes included increased domestic production by 
means of protecting monopolists’ and cartels’ interests against both internal and foreign competition. Increased 
domestic production was to be complemented by a positive trade balance, achieved by various restrictions applied to 
imports and domestic consumption, and protection granted to producers and exporting merchants such as the British 
East India Company. Export of silver and gold was also to be restricted in order to increase the available resources of 
the treasury, which, adding to the positive monetary flows generated by the balance of trade could, in the end, result 
into increased national welfare. As an initial stream of mercantilist thought, English bullionist theory advocated for 
the practice of trade protectionism, while French Colbertism, the more applied variant of mercantilism, concentrated 
on advocating for better organization and regulation of domestic production. 
Thus, mercantilist philosophy introduced the concept of trade rivalry between European nation-states in a zero 
sum game at the international level, creating the theory seed of future concepts of competitiveness of nations. 
Although protectionist policy instruments have partly lost their attractiveness today, export encouraging and 
productivity gains advocated for by mercantilist thought adepts are still viable public policies goals. 
3.2. Absolute advantage 
Adam Smith (1776), in its Wealth of Nations, opposed mercantilist ideas that consistent restrictions on import and 
sustained efforts to increase export would result in increased inflows of precious metals and thus, national welfare. 
He argued that it would be improbable for all nations to become simultaneously richer by following protectionist 
trade policies as one nation’s exports necessarily represent imports of the other(s). By developing the concepts of 
absolute advantage and international labour division and specialization, Smith advocated for free trade in the 
international arena. As Alan S. Blinder (2008) noticed, Adam Smith’s insight of the rationale behind free trade 
between nations was similar to that applying to everyday life decisions of individuals or families: „It is the maxim of 
every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. 
[...] If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of 
them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.” 
In Smith’s view, the absolute advantage represents a nation’s ability to produce at lower costs than any other 
nation and to sell the resulting products at lower prices in the international market. The main sources of absolute 
advantage of a nation thus reside in factor endowment (i.e. natural advantage) and/ or in production technology 
employed. As the argument goes, international free trade would foster the deepening of labour division at the 
international level which, in turn, would transform into productivity gains and technological advancement, 
ultimately increasing the absolute advantage of the nation’s industry. Free trade, in Smith’s view would transform 
into a virtuous circle fostering economic growth of all nations specialised in those production processes where 
nations display absolute advantages.  
In terms of macroeconomic competitiveness, Smith’s absolute advantage theory simply states that a nation is 
competitive provided that it possesses at least one absolute advantage in one productive sector. The absolute 
advantage theory, however, only offers a static interpretation of a single trigger of trade, namely pre-existing natural 
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advantages. More recent concepts such as competitive advantage, as a source of trade and prosperity, reflect a more 
dynamic view of economic actors and sectors; such competitive advantages can be continuously generated by early 
adoption of technological advancements, by design differentiation or customisation of products or by providing 
value augmenting services to the consumers, by rapidly achieving economies of scale in the production processes, or 
by simply benefitting from better local infrastructure, low cost and skilled labour force or better business 
environment etc. Additionally, absolute advantage theory cannot entirely explain modern international trade flows 
(i.e. within sector international trade, vertical integration or trade between countries that do not display absolute 
advantages in any of their productive sectors etc.). Finally, although Smith advocated against trade protectionism 
and despite his laissez-faire approach, his international trade theory does not clearly explain how the deepening of 
international specialization is obtainable without any governmental intervention. 
3.3. Comparative advantage 
According to Donald J. Boudreaux (2008): “When asked by mathematician Stanislaw Ulam whether he could 
name an idea in economics that was both universally true and not obvious, economist Paul Samuelson’s example 
was the principle of comparative advantage. That principle was derived by David Ricardo in his 1817 book, 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Ricardo’s result, which still holds up today, is that what matters is not 
absolute production ability but ability in producing one good relative to another.” Thus, According to Robert Torrens 
(1815) and David Ricardo (1817), the rationale behind international labour division and specialization reside not in 
the absolute advantages, as Smith predicted, but in the relative advantage, understood as a lower opportunity cost. 
Countries will specialise in production of those goods that require lower opportunity costs as compared to their 
trading partners, i.e. will specialise in the production that displays comparative advantage. In other words, a 
country’s production efficiency measure for one product depends on the foregone production of all other goods and 
services compared with the foregone production of all other goods and services sacrificed by other countries that 
produce, or might produce the same product. 
In a simple model, with two countries, two goods and one production factor (labour), some theoretical 
consequences follow: i) if one country has a comparative advantage for one good, the trading partner country must 
have a comparative advantage for the other; ii) any country is internationally competitive as long as it has a 
comparative advantage at in least one industry; iii) no country can lose all comparative advantages if another country 
more rapidly adopts technical advancements; iv) no country can display comparative advantages in all industries 
although it may be a faster technology improvements adopter. 
The comparative advantage theory also has implications for the development of the competitiveness concept. 
Since all countries possess at least one comparative advantage, they all are internationally competitive with respect 
to one product, at least. Additional critique is similar to that directed towards Smith’s theory of absolute advantage: 
i) the conceptual model is static and does not explain the existence of comparative advantages between modern, 
industrial countries; ii) the theoretical model is not valid for countries that display the same opportunity costs and 
current and future increased factor mobility and technological, societal etc. convergence can transform such 
hypothesis into reality; iii) the model in itself does not prove that international specialization is attainable without 
external (i.e. governmental) influence; iv) international competitiveness does not exclusively depend on opportunity 
costs. 
3.4. Relative endowment with production factors 
According to Mark Blaug (1992), the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) model of international trade builds on Smith’s and 
Ricardo’s previous theoretical developments regarding the rationale behind international trade: the relative 
endowment with production factors, which determines the international specialization of countries in the production 
of goods that require production factors that are naturally more abundant. Unlike Ricardo’s model, based on labour 
productivity, the H-O one introduces an additional factor (capital); technology is deemed uniform and the production 
factors immobile at the international level. Differences in productivity levels displayed by countries and, therefore, 
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in international competitiveness, come from countries’ different endowment with factors and different technologies 
employed (i.e. distinct combination of production factors). 
The H-O model does not exhaust possible explanations regarding the sources of international competitiveness as 
it does not take into account such characteristics as the size of the domestic market, economies of scale, product 
differentiation, quality of entrepreneurship etc. Like previous theoretical models, H-O model takes the same 
approach of explaining international trade based on long term natural advantages. The conclusion that competitive 
advantage is not technology dependent is at least debatable. Furthermore, not all countries equally benefit from trade 
liberalization. Developing countries may become victims of the poverty trap as technological gap between developed 
and developing countries will deepen in the long run. 
Further theoretical developments and clarifications of the H-O model include the explanation of Leontief’s 
paradox, according to which countries well-endowed with capital may, in fact, specialise in exporting labour 
intensive products due to either a relative endowment with highly skilled labour force or to the specialization in 
labour intensive innovative products, as Vernon noticed in its life cycle of product theory. 
4. Contemporary theoretical controversies regarding the international competitiveness of countries 
Contemporary theoretical controversies regarding the international encompass detractors of competitiveness as a 
macroeconomic concept as well as authors advocating for the validity of such concept based on dynamic approaches 
of competitiveness or interstate rivalry. 
4.1. Modern critique of international competitiveness of countries 
Paul R. Krugman (1994, 1995, and 1996) has argued that international competitiveness of countries does not 
make sense as a macroeconomic concept. His main arguments include the following: i) from a Ricardian 
perspective, all countries possess a comparative advantage; ii) states cannot go bankrupt whereas companies can; iii) 
international competitiveness of domestic companies can negatively affect the international competitiveness of other 
national companies; iv) countries do not compete economically whereas companies do, as they are involved in 
potentially zero sum games; v) global trade between countries is a positive sum game in which different economic 
development rhythms of countries foster the development of global markets and all economic partners of faster 
developing countries benefit from the availability of better and/ or cheaper products and better terms of trade. 
In Krugman’s opinion, policy makers should not be concerned with increasing the national welfare and 
competitiveness, as competitiveness is an essentially microeconomic concept and international trade an above zero 
sum game. 
4.2. Modern theoretical approaches supporting the concept of international competitiveness of countries 
According to Horst Siebert (2005) the national welfare is mainly the result of a dynamic, competitive behaviour 
of at least three levels of economic actors: i) companies, that compete in international product markets; ii) territories 
(regions or countries), that compete for mobile production factors; and iii) immobile production factors (such as low 
skilled labour force) that compete for income levels. Thus, competition between locations becomes a source of 
international competitiveness, with governments aiming to increase their attractiveness through adequate 
infrastructure endowments or business climate policies. 
Other dynamic approaches of welfare are reflected in various definitions of competitiveness employed by 
international economic organizations. European Commission (2004a) sees competitiveness as„ a measure of an 
economy´s ability to create valuable goods and services productively in a globalising world so as to raise the 
standard of living and secure high employment.” The OECD defines the international competitiveness of a country 
as „the degree to which it can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test 
of international markets, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its people over the 
longer term”. The World Economic Forum (2005 to 2014) defines competitiveness as “the set of institutions, 
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policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country”. The actual level of productivity, in turn, 
determines the level of prosperity that an economy can reach and the rhythm of economic growth of that country.  
Prestowitz (2000) contradicts Krugman and states that international trade can become a zero sum game between 
two trading countries. Two comparably developed countries that produce similar ranges of products may find 
themselves competing for jobs and incomes instead of taking advantage of their comparative advantages. Thus, 
whereas most economists agree that free trade is appositive sum game that creates welfare, other economists argue 
that some degree of rivalry between countries is inevitable in a globalized world economy, the idea of international 
competitiveness of nations being associated with rivalry, because the term competitiveness is not about a country´s 
absolute performance, but about how well it does relative to other countries. 
5. A policy approach of EU competitiveness 
Although it has been quite frequently used in EC’s communications, the concept of competitiveness does not 
seem to address a common understanding among EU countries and it is not unanimously accepted at the institutional 
level. 
In order to clarify various concepts of competitiveness within EU’s approach, we investigated the problem from 
three perspectives: i) institutional, ii) statistical and iii) strategic. 
5.1. The institutional perspective of EU competitiveness 
Within EU, competitiveness is the umbrella goal for different areas of integration and convergence of what 
generally can be called business sophistication. Under the competitiveness umbrella, the policies that address the 
internal market, industry, research and innovation, space and SME’s are interweaved and follow a common vision of 
growth. (see Figure 1) The strategic guidelines of competitiveness policy are established by the Competitiveness 
Council (COMPET), one of the ten EU Councils, and the Council’s technical meetings are dedicated only to the 
developments of one of the five distinct policies, at a time. The Council lacks an encompassingmonitoring 
instrument of competitiveness in general and of the implementation of all the related policies. 
Figure 1. EU’s Competitiveness Policy 
 
Source: authors’ concept 
 
Having most of the attributes of command and control for each of the envisaged policies distributed 
betweendifferent directorate generals, research institutes and various regulatory bodies, even the European 
Commission might miss a unitary approach of competitiveness. The results of the competitiveness policy are 
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dissipated in few different and uncorrelated reports which describe each field on quantitative basis, but fail to tackle 
competitiveness as a whole. 
Taking each policy separately, they do seem to address coherently all the problems of EU enterprises and 
business environment: market access, entrepreneurship, finance, energy costs, innovation investments etc. Instead, it 
is not clear how all the policies together address the same goal of competitiveness for which they are designed. 
Apparently, EU competitiveness analyses and policies are sector and member states oriented whereas the global 
competitiveness of EU as a whole lacks the adequate assessment instruments comparable with global 
competitiveness index (GCI) for instance and, therefore, policy actions might not be sufficiently adequate to the 
general declared aim. 
As a response to the crisis, EC has recently become more aware of the need of intervention in industrial sectors 
to supplement its previous free market laissez-faire and horizontal enabling policy measures. This partly reflects the 
acknowledgement of slow economic recovery, weak business environment and low investment in innovation, which 
make EU products and services less competitive on the global market. EC has designed a new industrial policy in 
three steps, centred on competitiveness and sustainability. (EC, 2010) The topics that establish the renaissance of the 
EU industry are congruent with the Europe 2020 Agenda. Investing in innovation and technology is the main policy 
that will enable the factors of growth. The new industrial policy establishes the priorities of intervention, in the 
sectors that were identified as the most promising to perform on the global market, like advanced manufacturing, 
key emerging technologies (KET’s), bio products, vehicles and vessels, sustainable buildings and smart grids(EC, 
2014). 
From another point of view, the Innovation Union, another EC initiative, is set to make EU a global performer 
in science and the most advanced knowledge economy. The competitiveness scope here is to follow up excellence in 
science and innovation, to address structural changes and societal challenges. (EC, 2013) 
5.2. Measuring EU competitiveness 
In terms of measuring competitiveness, it is obvious that the methodologies that EC employs have been 
designed to measure variables specific to objectives of each component of competitiveness policy. The predominant 
competitiveness assessment instrument is quantitative data analysis. EC does not use qualitative data and indexes to 
describe competitiveness factors, there are few composite indicators to describe industrial performance. In that 
sense, industrial competitiveness of countries has low comparability with GCI.  
The industrial competitiveness of member states and of the EU is assessed based on 25 indicators, which are 
grouped in the following competitiveness factors: i) the ability to innovate, ii) sustainability, iii) the ability to export, 
iv) business environment and entrepreneurship, v) public administration,vi) finance and investments. These six 
groups can be more or less equivalent with GCI pillars (Sala-i-Martin, Artadi, 2004) (see Table 1) 
Table 1. Equivalence of European Competitiveness Factors and GCI Pillars 
European Competitiveness Factors GCI Pillars 
Ability to innovate 
Pillar 12. Innovation 
Pillar 5. Higher education and training 
Pillar 7. Labor market efficiency  
Pillar 9. Technological readiness 
Sustainability Different approach 
Ability to export 
Pillar 10. Market size 
Pillar 6. Goods market efficiency 
Business environment and 
entrepreneurship 
Pillar 11. Business sophistication 
Public administration Pillar 1. Institutions 
Finance and investments Pillar 8. Financial market development 
Source: authors’ concept 
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The following GCI pillars are not monitored in the case of EU industrial competitiveness: i) Pillar 2, 
Infrastructure, ii) Pillar 3, Macroeconomic stability and iii) Pillar 4, Health and primary education. In the case of 
sustainability, GCI has a different approach than EU. GCI tries to define sustainable competitiveness as a standalone 
concept, which integrates social and environmental sustainability with the notion of productivity. (GCI, 2010) It 
investigates not only whether a country has the potential to grow, but whether the national development process can 
lead to sustainable prosperity. (GCI, 2014) In that sense, GCI relates social and environmental sustainability to the 
twelve competitiveness pillars. In EU, on the other hand, considering the Europe 2020 agenda and the commitment 
to transform the economy into a low-carbon economy, sustainability has become a driver of competitiveness and a 
dimension of economic growth. 
A new concept of competitiveness proposed by the EC is knowledge economy competitiveness. This concept 
has emerged from EU’s ambition to become the most competitive knowledge economy in the world. In that sense, 
competitiveness measures innovation performance of EU and of the member states. This can be related to the GCI 
innovation-driven stage of an economy (Sala-i-Martin, Artadi, 2004).The Innovation Union competitiveness is 
based on 25 indicators, others than those of the industrial competitiveness. (EC, 2013) These indicators can be 
grouped in the following categories: i) investment in knowledge, ii) scientific excellence, iii) innovation trade, iv) 
structural changes and societal challenges, Europe 2020 objectives for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
5.3. The strategic perspective of EU competitiveness 
Can EU become more competitive? And if this is possible, what kind of competitiveness should foster: international 
competitiveness of countries, of regions, cities or industries? What kind of competitive advantage will boost growth? 
Can knowledge and technology drivers compete against resources and other basic capitals that still boost the 
emergent economies? These are a few of the key questions that EU leaders and the policy makers have to answer in 
the next decade. How can EU deal with each member state’s ambition to perform on the global market and the 
catching up in the same time? EU is far from being a homogenous and cohesive entity, which has the ability to 
behave like one major power in the global economy. Structural differences between economies, East-West and 
North-South productivity gaps, the state sovereignty, social and regional disparities, competition between member 
states on resources and labor and more recently the economic and geopolitical crisis are few of the challenges that 
erode EU competitiveness. The European Union was affected by structural changes that amounted to a loss in the 
weight of industry in favor of services. These structural changes varied from one country to another and need to be 
compensated by higher productivity levels in manufacturing sector. The goal of the new EU industrial policy is to 
increase productivity of manufacturing sector and to lead EU enterprises on a better position in the global value 
chain, based on competitive advantages they have in knowledge and technology. In the same time, the EU’s 
structural rigidity averts it from innovating easily. This vicious circle constrains EU’s capabilities and determines its 
follower position in the innovation course with the US. The reasons of the EU’s delay can be explained by the low 
productivity of manufacturing, heavy legislation, low ICT investments and low trade of research output (EC, 2013). 
EU is trying to build a new model of societybased on sustainable growth concept, but sustainability has a cost. 
Europe 2020 strategy establishes a vision for Europe and builds on three determinant transformations of the 
economy: a low-carbon economy, an inclusive labor market and the smart specialization of regions, based on 
investment in innovation. These three pillars are going to boost the economic growth. But who is going to support 
the costs of transformation? The cost could affect EU companies’ competitiveness on the global market, as it is now.  
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Figure 2. Phases of EU competitiveness as a premise for catching up 
Source: authors’ concept 
 
From the strategic perspective, in the long run EU will become more competitive if it is to accomplish the three 
required transformations in the economy, in order to compensate the structural changes that caused its drop in 
productivity and to finally ensure convergence of the member states. The Figure 2 describes the level of 
competitiveness which EU aims to attain and which eventually leads to convergence.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has raised the questions about EU competitiveness approaches within the larger scientific debate on 
the role of competitiveness to boost economic growth. The first part of the article was dedicated to present the 
theoretical framework of debate, based on a literature review that underlined the evolution of the concept in different 
stages of economic thinking.  
Coming closer to a more applied approach, the next part of the paper recalled few of the dedicated policies, 
which European Union has designed and implemented following its purpose of a common vision of growth for 
Europe. In that sense, three perspectives of the competitiveness policy have tried to clarify EU’s practical approach 
on competitiveness. 
Europe 2020 strategy establishes a vision for Europe and builds on three determinant transformations of the 
economy: a low-carbon economy, an inclusive labor market and the smart specialization of regions, based on 
investment in innovation.  
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